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I wish to discuss Thomistic ethics in this essay in a way
that seeks to integrate Aquinas's natural law teaching with his treat-
ment of the virtues, most particularly with the virtue of prudentia or
practical wisdom.1 Natural law's importance in the moral philosophy
of Saint Thomas has been given undue and autonomous emphasis
in my view; I want to make a case that any account of natural law
that neglects the role of practical wisdom—and of the other virtues
as well—in the natural law's development and application simply
falls into incoherence. But there have been philosophers who have
seen problems with reconciling practical wisdom and the natural law
within Aquinas's moral teaching, and I will begin with a discussion
of some of the difficulties they have seen.2
1. Prudentia is the Latin translation of Aristotle's phronesis. I take the term
"practical wisdom" to best translate phronesis and prudentia, words that, as I say
below, are roughly synonymous; I suggest some differences later in my essay. When
I use the English word "prudence," I mean it as a synonym for Thomas's prudentia.
2. In the discussion that follows, I will restrict comment to only a few philosophers
writing on Aristotle and Aquinas. Of course, a massive body of scholarship addresses
Aristotle's ethics as well as Thomas's natural law theory. It is my desire in this
essay to speak incisively and clearly about a specific set of issues. I believe this can
best be done by addressing the primary texts in Aquinas himself, without repeated
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Students of Aquinas have long been troubled by apparent in-
compatibilities between Thomistic and Aristotelian ethics. Foremost
among these incompatibilities is the tension between the standards of
right action that they employ. Aristotle holds phronesis, the practical
wisdom of the fully virtuous person, to be the chief determinant of
right action; further, he says very little, and that little is obscure,
about natural or nonconventional justice. Aquinas, on the other hand,
propounds the doctrine of natural law precisely in order to describe
a nonconventional standard of justice accessible to all rational crea-
tures. In this context Thomas recalls the remarks of Paul in Romans
2:14: "where the gentiles who have not the law do by nature those
things that are of the law."3 Aquinas sees this Pauline teaching as
presupposing a natural law, one consistent with divine law but not
requiring special revelation. Aristotle and Aquinas thus appear to
hold different, and perhaps incompatible, standards of justice. This
difference of opinion goes beyond a possible disagreement between
Aquinas and the pagan philosopher he so esteemed; Thomas imports
the standard of practical wisdom, what he calls "prudence," into his
own ethics. There then look to be two distinct standards of right
action within Thomistic ethics itself. If these standards are separate
and unintegrated, Thomas faces the charge of a naive or immature
eclecticism. If these standards are not only separate but incompatible,
Thomas faces the far more serious charge of internal inconsistency.
What I want to defend is an interpretation of Aquinas that reconciles
practical wisdom and the natural law; such an account may also render
his ethics more deeply Aristotelian than it is sometimes taken to be.4
reference to other interpretations and perspectives. I invite Nussbaum and Goerner
into the discussion because their particular interpretations, which are also concerned
with connections between practical wisdom and law in some sense, help to draw out
important issues that I wish to address. I do not pretend, of course, that theirs are
the only important interpretations of Aristotelian practical wisdom or of Thomistic
natural law.
3. Quoted by Thomas in the Summa theobgiae 1-2.91.2. Translations from the
Summa are my own unless otherwise noted. The Latin text from which I am working
is that of the Leonine edition of Opera omnia (Rome, 1882- ).
4. In all of this presentation, I acknowledge my indebtedness to Alasdair Mac-
Intyre, whose discussion of these issues in chapters 9 and 10 of Whose Justice?
Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) taught me
a great deal.
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Let me now describe further the potential incompatibilities between
prudence and natural law.
I am taking Aristotelian phronesis, roughly synonymous with Thorn-
istic "prudence," to be a capacity for judgment in individual cases that
takes account of the particular circumstances of each situation. This
excellence is dependent, as are all the virtues on Aristotle's view,
on, the proper early moral education provided by the community of
the polis. Well'developed phronesis is the virtue that completes all
the other virtues. That is to say, it makes out of what is originally
mere habituation, the stuff of early moral training,5 action that is
rational and fully deliberate. Practical wisdom governs an agent's
deeds in such a way that he or she always acts to achieve the good
in individual circumstances. It thus perfects all other virtues because
it determines their exercise at any particular time; for this reason the
other virtues are immature and, as it were, without proper counsel
if phronesis is lacking. While desire for the proper end is secured by
habituation primarily, these ends would never be achieved without
the deliberations of phronesis regarding the means to those ends.6
Further, the virtuous agent possessed of practical wisdom recognizes
the good that he or she seeks to achieve as good; this is to say that the
phronetic person sees the point of his or her earlier habituation. What
I want to emphasize in this short summary of Aristotelian teaching are
the following points. First, phronesis is chiefly a capacity for judgment
about how to achieve the good with respect to a particular circum-
stance, i.e., it must needs attend to particulars in securing these means.
Second, its development presupposes the moral training provided by
a specific kind of community, the polis; this training sets the ends at
which phronetic deliberation aims. Yet only with the acquisition of
practical wisdom comes a right appreciation of the goods into desire
of which the agent has been habituated.
Let me now proceed to a brief exposition of Thomistic natural
law. In doing so, I will postpone more sophisticated exegesis until
later. I take what I will say here to be more or less uncontroversial,
i.e., to be acceptable according to most understandings of Thomistic
natural law. I base my remarks chiefly on that section of the prima
5. See Nicomachean Ethics 2.3.1104b9—13. The translation is my own.
6. See Nicomachean Ethics 6.13.1145a5-6.
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secundae of the Summa theologίae that treats of laws; I will refer as
well to other portions of the Summa. Natural law, on Aquinas's view,
derives from certain claims about human nature a set of exceptionless
rules with respect to types of actions.7 If one then adopts the standard
of natural law, one must ignore all but the relevant type'differences
when deliberating about actions in any particular situation. Of course,
any action and any situation can be described in an infinite number
of ways; for the natural law theorist, what matters is whether or not
any part of the description of a given action falls under the natural
law's prohibitions or prescriptions concerning kinds of actions. For
example, if a proposed action counts as a genuine instance of adultery,
or murder, or lying, then that action is forbidden, on Thomas's view,
no matter what additional descriptions might be supplied. There is
then a prima facie philosophical incompatibility between these two
standards, insofar as a morality which attends to the particulars of a
situation, as does Aristotle's, might be seen to conflict with a morality
that judges according to general types or categories of actions.
Lest I be accused of addressing a contrived conflict, I note here that
recent philosophers have cited this difference between Aristotle and
Aquinas in criticisms of Aquinas. Martha Nussbaum in particular has
found fault with Thomas's rule-following ethics over and against what
is on her view the superior standard of the Aristotelian virtues, with its
stress on perception and moral imagination.8 On her view, an ethics
of exceptionless rules must fail to do justice to the unique particulars
7. Ultimately I do not want to refute this traditional view but, rather, to reshape it;
it is to the core sense of natural law, the inclinationes, that primary emphasis belongs.
Traditional interpretations of Thomas's natural law theory have unduly emphasized
the role that rules play and, I will argue, neglect an explanation of their origin. For
the following point about crucial issues for the natural law theorist, and Thomas in
particular, I am indebted to Herbert McCabe's clarity in his own formulation of this
point; see his What Is Ethics All About? (Washington, D.C: Corpus Books, 1969).
8. The dim view that Martha Nussbaum takes of Aquinas is most explicit in an
early work, her commentary on Aristotle's De motu animalium (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978), in the essay "Practical Syllogisms and Practical Science." But
her critique of any ethics employing exceptionless rules continues in even her more
recent work. See her "The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception
of Private and Public Rationality," in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in
Ancient Philosophy, ed. John ]. Cleary, vol. 1 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of
America, 1986).
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of a given situation; likewise such a system underemphasizes the role
that "right emotion" must play in mature moral action. She wishes to
allow for a certain "improvisation" even within rule following itself.
But there are also others who, with greater sympathy for Aquinas,
find the standard of natural law inferior. In his exegesis of Thomistic
ethics, E. A. Goerner has stressed the superiority of practical wisdom
over natural law, calling natural law "the bad man's view of Thomistic
natural right."9 According to Goerner, natural law secures the success
of divine providence by fear of penalty, through consequences that
flow naturally from violations of the law.10 Practical wisdom, on the
other hand, is embodied in the judgment of the virtuous person who
acts through love of the good, not through fear of penalty. This
standard of prudence is intrinsically superior to natural law, on his
view, because of the nobler intentions of the agent and because the
standard permits and requires attention to particulars. Such an atten-
tion will allow for variations on how the good is achieved; variation
would not be possible should the natural law itself be taken as the
primary standard of right action. Thus both Nussbaum and Goerner,
from quite different starting points, find fault with the standard of
Thomistic natural law understood in terms of a code of absolute rules.
Nussbaum views prudence and the natural law to be separate and
incompatible standards of right action. Goerner takes them to be at
best functionally compatible standards, the natural law serving as a
kind of initiation into the life of full virtue.
But what I am arguing for is an understanding of Thomistic natural
law that in fact requires the activity of prudence in the application of
the law's precepts and that requires prudence even for the discovery of
the law. This issue of discovery is critical insofar as Thomas claims for
this law a kind of promulgation independent of special revelation; this
law must be accessible in some sense to everyone. Indeed Thomas's
own general definition of "law" explicitly requires as much. In defining
law per se, Aquinas assigns it four characteristics: "it is nothing else
than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by the one
9. See Goerner's O n Thomistic Natural Law," Political Theory 7 (1979): 101-122,
and his "Thomistic Natural Right," Political Theory 11 (1983): 393-418.
10. For a discussion and critique of Goerner's interpretation of natural law, see
my "E. A. Goerner on Thomistic Natural Law," Political Theory 18 (1990): 638-655.
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who has care of the community, and promulgated."11 Since the natural
law is binding on all human beings, it needs must be satisfactorily
published to them.12 Thus, in a way different from Aristotle, Aquinas
wishes to make progress in the moral life available to all people,
regardless of individual community or history. Not that Thomas abol-
ishes all operative notions of community: he simply creates a new
kind, a community rooted in the essential characteristics of a species.
The natural law is thus primarily, on his view, the rational crea-
ture's "participation"13 in eternal law, the law by which God governs
the entire cosmos; the community to which the natural law pertains
is the community of rational creatures. Indeed, law as Thomas treats
of it in the prima secundae is an analogical term, and the heart of the
analogy is the eternal law. All other forms of law of which Aquinas
speaks (natural, human, divine) are in one way or another related
to it. I shall focus primarily on how the natural law functions as the
means by which rational creatures are subject to eternal law.
What does Thomas mean when he speaks of our "participation" in
eternal law? Within his initial discussion of natural law, Thomas links
it chiefly with God's providential ordering of the cosmos. Natural law
is what orders us to our "proper act and end" by natural inclination;14
this is to say that natural law, whatever else it involves, is primarily
how we are directed to our end, which is ultimately God. This
direction is not coercive or without sense for the rational creature;
Thomas calls the guidance law gives "instruction,"15 and he claims
that it is the "light of natural reason," permitting us knowledge of
good and evil, that so instructs us in natural law.16 Thomas's own
emphasis on the natural law is in terms of inclinationes, ways of being
directed to one's end, not in terms of any set of rules.
11. Summa theobgiae 1-2.90.4-
12. This definition of law (in 1-2.90.4) occurs in the most general treatment of
law; Thomas proceeds in subsequent questions to extend the definition in specifying
laws of many different kinds. The definition, being generic, cannot be adequate for
understanding any particular form of actual law.
13. Summa theobgiae 1-2.91.2.
14. Summa theobgiae 1-2.91.2: "per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad
debitum actum, et finem."
15. Summa theobgiae 1-2.90 prologue.
16. Summa theobgiae 1-2.91.2.
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All of this having been said, let me go on to flesh out
my own interpretation of Thomistic natural law. I seek to bring to-
gether Aquίnas's use of exceptionless rules and his new community of
rational creatures within the natural law with his (more Aristotelian)
emphasis on the virtues, especially the virtue of practical wisdom or
prudence. I believe that the way in which Thomas speaks of natural
law shows clearly that it is principally forms of directedness toward
our proper ends or goods; this much has been noted already. But, and
moreover, if one takes the rational character of this law seriously,
then necessarily natural law also affords us understanding of the goods
to which we are so directed. We must see and assent to the goods
to which we are inclined by our natures. In this sense, natural law
clearly is meant to have some of the components of Aristotelian
phronesίs, which also enables the appraisal and recognition of certain
ends as good.
In question 94 of the prίma secundae, Thomas discusses natural law
and its most fundamental characteristics. He begins with a description
of the way in which natural law is a habit;17 natural law is a habitus
insofar as we hold the fundamental principles of this law by the habit
of synderesis. These principles form the core knowledge of natural law
within us, and these principles, held by synderesis, are "indelible,"
persisting in even the most vicious.18 Practical reason pertains to
action, and so its first principles must pertain to what is to be sought
or avoided within action.
. . . so good is that which first falls under the apprehension of the practical
reason, which is ordered to action: since every agent acts for an end, which
has the aspect of a good. Therefore, the first principle in the practical
reason is that which is founded on the aspect of good, that good is that
which all things desire. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good
is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.19
Every rational creature has this much of an apprehension of good
and evil, even babies and the damned.20 Thomas also claims that
17. Summa theologiae 1-2.94.1.
18. Summa theologiae 1-2.94.6: "Quantum ergo ad ilia principia communis, lex
naturalis nullo modo potest a cordibus hominum deleri in universali."
19. Summa theologiae 1-2.94-2.
20. Summa theologiae 1-2.94-1 sc.
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synderesis is infallible,21 although application of its principles can
be in error. I understand by this claim of infallibility a fundamental
link with synderesis and what Thomas says regarding the will: that it
chooses always under the formal aspect of goodness, the ratio boni.22
I grant that this explanation of synderesis makes Aquinas's claim of
synderesis's freedom from error peculiar. It may just be peculiar. I
see its function as conceptual, determining how we consider actions,
choices, objects of desire—i.e., in terms oί goods and evils.
But why is synderesis so important for Aquinas? It is a Neoplatonic
import within Aquinas's largely Aristotelian epistemology. Its pres-
ence seems therefore problematic and has certainly vexed Thomas's
defenders to nightmare. 2 3 The importance of synderesis, on my view,
springs from the crucial starting point it provides for any inquirer
in the moral life; it is impossible, given this capacity, for an agent
completely to lack guidance in the moral life. He or she has even
initially some root, inerrant apprehension of the good with which
to begin the moral life and moral deliberation. We begin with at
least the necessary conceptual equipment. Notice that by adopting
synderesis Aquinas suggests a possible solution to a problem set him
by an inadequacy (from the Christian perspective) of Aristotelian
ethics: How does one make participation in the moral life available
to every human being, regardless of community, and yet answer the
need for moral education? One begins to do this by synderesis, which
provides the most basic tutelage in reasoning about action; it secures,
infallibly, that the right questions will be asked, that actions will be
reasoned about under the descriptions of good or evil.
Indeed I see synderesis, when coupled with the inclinationes that
are primarily the natural law, as taking the place of the Greek polis in
the role of providing initial moral training of the desires. The habit
of synderesis alone is by no means sufficient for ethical guidance.
The forms of directedness give practical content to the conceptual
21. Summa theobgίae 1.79.12 ad 3: "quod huiusmodi incommutabiles rationes
sunt prima principia operabilium, circa quae non contingit errare, et attribuuntur
rationi, sicut potentiae, et synderesi sicut habitui: unde et utroque, scilicet ratione,
et synderesi, naturaliter iudicamus."
22. Summa theoϊogίae 1-2.10 and 18 in particular.
23. Witness the cottage industry John Finnis and Germain Grisez have built up
in explaining the first principles within synderesis.
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apprehensions of good and evil provided by synderesis. Thus there are
on Aquinas's view activities and states that are naturally understood
to be either goods or evils. This much can be counted on no matter
what sort of human community it is to which one belongs. Such seems
to be Thomas's claim when he says that the natural law, in its most
general {communissima) principles, are known to all and cannot be
erased from the human heart.2^
Thomas speaks as well of the primary precepts of the natural law,
which pertain to the goods to which our inclinations direct us by
nature (recall this is the primary sense of "natural law" for Aquinas).
. . . thus it is that all those things to which the human being has a natural
inclination, reason naturally apprehends as goods and consequently as
things to be pursued, and their contraries as evil and things to be avoided.
Therefore the order of the precepts of the natural law is according to the
order of natural inclinations.25
In this secondary sense of natural law, the sense of its exceptionless
rules, there are three sets of precepts according to Aquinas.26 These
correspond to the hierarchy of the inclinationes themselves. First is a
set of precepts governing the preservation of human life, a good that
we share with all living things. Second are precepts pertaining to the
begetting and rearing of offspring, a good that we share with other ani-
mals. Finally, there are precepts governing the goods to which humans
incline as specifically rational beings; Thomas mentions in particular
our desire "to know the truth about God and to live in society."27
Significantly, Aquinas, in his core treatment of the contents of the
natural law, does not so much as spell out some of the actual rules
of the natural law. Instead, what he is concerned with is establishing
a fundamental link between any precept of the natural law and the
goods to which these precepts are ordered. Thomas does not here tell
us which rules are necessary for human beings to achieve the good of
24. Summa theobgίae 1-2.94.6. Such a claim is easy to make but hard to prove; I
suspect the only sort of proof possible would be phenomenological in kind. Simone
Weil, in her writings about the "human personality," might provide a good example
of such a proof. See the Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas (New York:
Moyer Bell, 1977), pp. 313-339.
25. Summa theobgiae 1-2.94.2.
26. Summa theobgίae 1-2.94.2.
27. Summa theobgiae 1-2.94.2.
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living in society; he tells us that some rules will be necessary to this
end.28 I emphasize this in the light of the characterization by many
philosophers of Thomas as a legalist and of his natural law as chiefly
rule oriented.
In what way are these precepts arrived at? Wha t are their actual
contents? I wish to maintain that they involve an articulation of
which actions are conducive towards, or destructive of, those goods
to which our inclinationes direct us. They are then further articulations
of what we mean by good and evil; as such, they enrich the conceptual
apprehensions of good and evil afforded by synderesis. But they may
also enrich our understanding of the forms of directedness themselves
insofar as they specify what is minimally necessary to attain those
goods of our nature; indeed, the discovery and observance of these
precepts may in part constitute these goods.
This discovery of the natural law occurs by way of reflection on the
goods to which we are directed by our natures and then by discovery
of the necessary means for achieving or constituting these goods. I
want to stress that this inquiry takes place within a life, within the
narrative context of experiences that engage a moral agent's intellect
and will in the making of concrete choices. In attention to what
makes up one's experience and in the making of choices, both good
and bad, a human being augments understanding of his or her own
nature and of what most promotes the flourishing of that nature.
This process of inquiry is then one of practical reasoning, practical
reasoning that can be carried on individually and communally. And in
so mentioning practical reasoning, I do mean to imply the operation
of some measure of phronetic, i.e., of prudential, deliberation.29
Such an understanding of natural law at least escapes the pitfalls of
treating the rules of the natural law as though they were self-evident;
the process I am describing would be far more rough-and-ready, also
28. Bear in mind that praeceptum need not mean "precept" in our sense of an
actual rule.
29. Thomas's treatment of the actual reasoning of natural law in the later articles
of question 94 shows just how far his understanding of the function of natural law
is from a mechanical, legalistic understanding (see, e.g., 1-2.94-4). Not only do we
need prudence to apply the "rules" of the natural law, but also the principles of the
natural law are very general and must be specified and amplified before they are
(practically) useful in guiding actual human choices.
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far more historical. Discovery takes time. There is certainly warrant
for such a reading of Aquinas, who repeatedly stresses how human
custom and moral disposition can impact our knowledge of the natural
law. In mentioning the "German robbers" who failed to recognize the
prohibition against theft, Thomas mentions passion, evil custom, and
an evil disposition of nature as damaging our ability to reason about
our good.30 To assert then that reasoning about our good at all, let
alone the achievement of excellence in it, is deeply influenced by
personal and social history hardly seems radical. Indeed, the presence
of the moral virtues also disposes us well to discovery of the law
of our nature.
This understanding of natural law also emphasizes its rational char^
acter. Only by the free exercise of our practical rationality could we
discover the natural law, and this discovery would involve in part do^
ing over again the work of the first legislator, God. In that sense, God
first manifests God's providence through the eternal law (in which
natural law participates) and so directs all creatures to God's own self.
Just so, men and women imitate (and yet obey) divine providence by
directing themselves in discovering and pursuing their good. Indeed,
this renders intelligible Aquinas's claim, earlier in the Summa, that
human prudence is included within the providence of God.31
It is essential to note that an understanding of particular rules
of the natural law, e.g., "Never murder,"32 is inseparable from an
understanding of the rules' point and purpose. What the prohibition
against murder prevents is the kind of disrespect for human life
that would be destructive of life in community; without this law,
a community could not exist in such a way as to pursue the various
goods constitutive of social life. And such an understanding of the
end or purpose of law can be given only by practical wisdom, on the
Aristotelian and the Thomistic views. Thus to divorce natural law
from the virtues is to misunderstand how both the law and the virtues
30. Summa theologίae 1-2.94.4-
31. Summa theologiae 1.22.2 ad 4. Note also that providentia and prudentia are
linked etymologically. I make exactly this point as well in my critique, Έ . A. Goerner
on Thomistic Natural Law," p. 645.
32. I take an example from the Decalogue. Thomas notes in Summa theologiae
1-2.100.1 that the moral precepts of the Old Law really amount to the natural law,
i.e., what we should have known anyway.
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conduce human beings to their proper goods and is to misunderstand
how one arrives at the specific rules of the natural law in the first
place. Given that only practical wisdom can yield a realization of the
ends we pursue as genuine goods, some degree of it must operate in
the discovery of the natural law.
Aquinas says as much in his own discussion of prudence (practical
wisdom).33 Aquinas follows to some extent Aristotle when he says
that moral virtue sets the ends for prudence.34 But Thomas also states
that prudence relates to synderesis, as "natural reason determines
the ends of the moral virtues by what is called synderesis."35 Thus
prudence ultimately takes its goals from synderesis; indeed, Thomas
goes on to state that prudence reasons from synderesis, "just as un-
derstanding of [first] principles moves scientific knowledge."36 Here
he seems to me to suggest that prudence precisely involves insight
into synderesis even as it reasons from it. Such a reading would be
much in accord with the account I have sketched concerning our
"natural" knowledge—begun in synderesis but continued by a delib-
erative prudence—of good and evil. Prudence on this view functions,
even in imperfect exercise, within our discovery of the natural law,
helping to generate the very rules it will then work to apply and
extend. For no rule, let alone those of the natural law, can be applied
or constituted without an accompanying understanding of the rule's
point as given by practical wisdom. This is so because to know how
to apply a rule or even to know which rule to apply requires the
exercise of practical judgment; such judgment would have to pick out
of the situation at hand the relevant particulars in order to know
which rule is appropriate for it. For example, even applying a rule
as absolute as the prohibition against murder requires some grasp of
what constitutes murder and a grasp of which situations fall under
that prohibition, a task that is not always easy. Witness contemporary
debates on the ethical status of abortion, capital punishment, and
nuclear deterrence. One cannot intelligently select and apply a rule
without some (prudential) grasp of the good that the rule is seeking to
secure or protect. And some rules must be exceptionless, for example,
33. Summa theologiae 2-2.47-50 in particular.
34. Summa theologiae 1-2.47.2.
35. Summa theologiae 2-2.47.6 ad 1, to which compare 1.79.12.
36. Summa theologiae 2-2.47.6 ad 3.
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the rule against murder, because certain goods are so crucial for an
attainment of our end and because certain actions, such as murder,
operate so as to destroy these goods.
Indeed, in his discussion of the moral precepts of the Old Law, cod-
ified in the Decalogue, Thomas says that these precepts are reducible
to the natural law because they are accessible to natural reason.37 The
Decalogue then articulates what we should, as it were, have known
anyway. He explicitly rejects the possibility that these laws could ever
be dispensed with because
the precepts of the Decalogue contain the very intention of the legislator,
namely God. For the precepts of the first table, which are ordered to God,
contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God. The
precepts of the second table contain the order of justice to be observed
among human beings, namely that no one do what is undue, and that to
each should be returned what is owed: for in this manner are the precepts
of the Decalogue to be understood. On this account, the precepts of the
Decalogue are entirely indispensable.38
It is clear in this passage that Aquinas understands the precepts of
the Decalogue, also of the natural law, to be in part articulations of
what virtue is as it pertains to God and to life in human community.
(Recall what he says in the prima secundae 94.3 about all acts of
virtue being of the natural law.) These rules do not express merely
contingent means to the good; they constitute in part what it is to be
just to others and to worship God rightly. When observed in the spirit
of the natural law, out of the desire for the goods to which the law
directs us, these rules help to specify what virtue is and observance
of these rules is constitutive of virtue.
That for Aquinas phronesis and the rules of the natural law stand
independent of one another cannot then be so. Neither can it be
that they are incompatible. We need practical wisdom in order to
discover and apply the rules of the natural law; but we also gain our
knowledge of the goods to which these rules should conduce from our
essential and dynamic directedness towards these goods. This direct-
edness is Thomas's primary sense of natural law. I hope it has become
clearer in what ways certain current interpretations of Aquinas fall
37. Summa theologiae 1-2.100.1.
38. Summa theologiae 1-2.100.8.
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short. Nussbaum, her emphasis on the virtues notwithstanding, fails
to understand that the virtues themselves presuppose a fundamental
orientation to the good; this orientation makes them means to, and
also constitutive of, human flourishing. This is simply how Aquinas
understands the natural law, not in terms of a code of rules. Likewise,
Nussbaum fails to see in what way rule following, even of the kind she
criticizes, requires some measure of prudence. A more careful reader
of Aquinas but in a vein similar to Nussbaum, Goerner characterizes
natural law persistently in terms of absolute rules; he, too, thereby
neglects the more fundamental form of natural law in the ίnclinationes.
By this neglect, he then fails also to see how the natural law and
prudence are interdependent. Thus, by too completely severing the
natural law from prudence, he does more than badly misinterpret
Aquinas: he makes it impossible to understand how the natural law
could function as a pedagogical tool (which is precisely the role on
which Goerner lays stress). Without some understanding of the goods
to which they are inclined by their natures (which would be given
in prudential reflection), the Germans could never learn to recognize
the "penalties" from which they suffer as penalties for the violation
of the natural law. The natural law might be their scourge; it could
never be their teacher.
I have thus far spoken of our knowledge of the natu-
ral law, aided by prudence, as a knowledge that is progressive and
historical; we work to acquire understanding of our natures, and of
the means for the flourishing of our natures, through a process of
inquiry that goes on over time individually and communally. But
in making this last point, I run the risk of treating natural law in
isolation from another form of law from which it can never be wholly
separate: human law. For human life is always lived in community, on
Thomas's view, and thus the general principles of the natural law must
be further articulated (and supplemented) according to the special
needs of individual communities; human law is the law of specific
communities. All such law should be derived from the natural law,
Thomas argues. That derivation can occur in two ways:
in one way, as conclusions from principles; in another way, as determi-
nations of certain generalities. The first way is similar to that by which
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demonstrative conclusions proceed from principles in the sciences. The
second way is similar to that by which, in the arts, common forms are
determined to a certain particular case.39
As an example of the first way, the way of conclusions from more
general principles, Thomas offers the move from "Do harm to no
one" to "Do not kill." As an example of the second way, the way
of further specification, Thomas explains that while the natural law
dictates that offenders should be punished, it does not say how; human
law has the job of determining what the punishment should be for
particular crimes.
Thus to speak of natural law as a guide for action by itself is a
mistake; on Thomas's view, it is the responsibility of human law,
the law of actual communities, to restate and to specify further what
the natural law teaches. Indeed, natural law serves as the standard of
justice for those making civil law. Thomas states that human law in
discord with the natural law is "a corruption of law."40 To go against
the natural law is to act against the human good; thus, civil laws
that are not ordered to the human good are, Aquinas says, more like
"violence rather than laws."41 Natural law is clearly intended to work
always in tandem with human law in communities; all law is intended
to make people good, Thomas says,42 and both the natural law and
human law command acts of all the virtues.43
Thus in his treatment of the human law Thomas again acknowl-
edges the specific social forms of human life; natural law does not work
in isolation, as a generic, and wholly adequate, moral standard applied
in the same way across all communities. Instead, natural law requires
further specificity in order to be effective as a guide to right action; this
specificity is given in human law, as formulated by prudent legislators.
At the same time, the natural law is the standard for judging the
justice of human laws; this act of criticism is accomplished in part by
39. Summa theologίae 1-2.95.2. I acknowledge the help of the English Dominican
Fathers' translation in guiding my own.
40. Ibid.
41. Summa theologίae 1-2.96.4-
42. Summa theologiae 1-2.92.1.
43. Summa theobgiae 1-2.94-3 and 96.3. Not all the vices are punished under
human law, however, lest the law become too burdensome and contempt for it be
taught (96.2 corp. and ad 2).
68 PAMELA M. HALL
assuring that the ends of human law coincide with the ends to which
we are ordered by the natural law.
I want to break stride at this point by going back to a
description I have given concerning discovery of the natural law. I
have said that the process of discovering the natural law is a gradual
one: it is a "historical narrative" involving reflection on who we
are as a species and within community, reflection that is ongoing
and corrigible. Such a process entails the activity of practical reason
operating both on the level of the individual moral agent and, also
importantly, on the level of the legislators and leaders of whole
communities (within the scope of human law as well). Let me try
to make some more specific remarks about this narrative process, and
about what facilitates this process. My remarks here can only be open-
ended and provisional; they will diverge from exegesis of Aquinas at
key points, but (it is to be hoped) only to return with illumination.
First, determining what we are as a species must be a historical
business. Knowledge of human nature is acquired gradually, by expe*
rience and reflection. No simple or intuitive path can arrive at an
adequate account of what we are as creatures and of what conduces
to our flourishing. Thus of course is there even less a way to derive
precepts in a simple manner from knowledge of our natures. There
can be no "reading off' of what to do from claims about our essence
or character. Such claims are hard-won and subject to revision; what
practical guidance such claims yield to us is likewise only carefully
drawn out.
Second, discovery of the natural law, as I take Thomas to describe
it, is extended through time and involves ongoing experience on both
the individual and social levels. This narrative process of discovery
coincides with, or rather presupposes, the narrative structure of human
experience itself. The life of an individual, or of a community, is best
represented in the terms of a story: this is the genre that most aptly
captures the form of human experience. As Augustine notes in the
Confessions, the very fact that our experience is distinguished in terms
of past, present, and future is a wonder and a puzzle. Our lives are
not only made up of a continual flow of sensations. They are also
characterized by the intentions and projects that link the moment
of the present with past and future actions, intentions, and projects.
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In this regard, characterizing our temporal experience as a series of
atomistic "moments" is unhelpful and obtuse. The "feel" of our time
is not atomistic. It has duration, as well as linkage with the past and
projection into the future.44
Likewise, it may only be by the living out of our plans and in-
tentions that we can come to understand what we were seeking in
those very plans and intentions. As Abigail Rosenthal puts it, "At
minimum, a story is a purpose transformed into enough experience to
allow that purpose to understand itself a little better."45 This helps us
to see why discovery of the natural law must be time-bound (and why
our conclusions about it must be open to revision). It is in the pursuit
(and, often, possession) of goods that we learn about what we did or
did not really desire. This is of course a kind of self-discovery. Also
important to remember is that our conceptions of goods, let alone
our conceptions of the virtues, are always themselves particularized
within a community or at the least a life. Reasoning, then, about what
we need to flourish will, then, always be reasoning about particular
goods in particular contexts. This is part of the practical nature of
this inquiry.
Third, can we say anything general about the nature of these partic-
ular inquiries? Alasdair Maclntyre, in his own discussion of narrative
in After Virtue, notes that the narrative stories of our individual lives
share at least two common features: they are ideological, i.e., they aim
at an end or goal; and they are unpredictable, i.e., subject to chance
and to the intervention of others. Thus Maclntyre goes on to claim
that the moral life is essentially a quest, a quest searching for what
the good is for us, both as individuals and as members of humanity.
He notes rightly that "a quest is always an education both as to the
character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge."46 For this
44- I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness in these matters to Stephen Crites,
"The Narrative Quality of Experience," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 39
(1971): 291-311. My discussion compresses many of the points he makes at greater
length.
45. Abigail Rosenthal, A Good Look At Evil (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1987), p. 13. Rosenthal uses in this book the notion of narrative as a way of
describing different sorts of evil human "types."
46. See Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981), p. 204. My discussion of Maclntyre is drawn from his chapter 15.
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reason Maclntyre gives the virtues such emphasis: they enable us to
live out our questions well, to succeed at our quest. For reasoning well
about our good (discovering the natural law in my understanding of
Aquinas) as a quest is not a process that goes on in a vacuum. We
do this work in the midst of, and about, the experiences and choices
that constitute and shape our lives. This work occurs within and about
the joys and sorrows, the suffering, the anxiety, the exhilaration, the
ambiguity, and even the terror of living the moral life. Quests are
taxing, trying affairs. About this Nussbaum has been right to stress
the need for courage and for tolerance of ambiguity in the moral life.
Behind or beneath this, however, I want to stress the commitment
necessary to make possible the kind of inquiry I am describing. O n e
must first believe the inquiry has a point, that how we live matters
(and perhaps this is what Maclntyre means when he says that our
lives are teleological). Quests, after all, are undertaken; we must begin
by accepting the charge of inquiry. Our commitment to the inquiry
begins to make possible the process of reflection, let alone the fear
and trembling, of the discovery of the natural law.
Fourth, we began with claims concerning the narrative structure of
experience and the narrative discovery of the natural law. But as we
all learn, one fundamental aspect of our experience, and the fate of
all plans we make and live out in experience, is the role of fortune
in completing or confounding our plans. A n d if h u m a n experience is
subject to chance, then we must wonder to what degree Fortune plays
a part. Maclntyre himself opens up this question in After Virtue, in
part to suggest that individual quests for the good may go unfinished,
being interrupted by d e a t h . 4 7 But how seriously may misfortune impair
our pursuit of the inquiry about the good? Recall that Aquinas denies
that all knowledge of the natural law can be expunged from the
h u m a n heart; he concedes tαat h u m a n community and passion can
obscure the "particulars" of the law. 4 8 We are back in some way to
the old Aristotelian problem concerning the necessity of proper moral
upbringing for progress in virtue. If we give tragedy its full due, is it
not possible that certain personal histories are too bereft of right
teaching, too full of corrupt influence, to engender the questions that
launch us on the quest for our good? About the natural law, we might
47. See Maclntyre, After Virtue, pp. 197-198.
48. Summa theologίae 1-2.94.4. The word Aquinas uses for "particulars" or "details"
is propria.
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ask if it can produce a just person from an unjust city.49 My sense is
that Thomas would deny this contingency; God's providence governs
even Fortuna. Thomas certainly does deny the possibility of simple
moral perplexity, in which a moral agent, without prior fault, cannot
help but do wrong. I am not satisfied with this profession of faith in
providence, so I raise it as a question.
In conclusion, let me multiply the senses of narrative to be recog'
nized in Thomas. I have spoken in this essay of the natural law and the
ongoing, narrative acquisition of knowledge of it. It is ongoing (1) in
our coming to understand more about our natures and (2) in our com-
ing to understand what means to choose in constituting the flourishing
of our natures. Thomas repeatedly indicates that our inquiry regarding
the natural law takes place socially and over time. Such indications
include how prudence, which requires experience, is necessary for
knowledge of the natural law. They also include his remarks about the
Germans and how cultural (and moral) impediments to our knowledge
of the natural law can exist.50 Add to this the fact that human law
is needed to articulate and to specify the natural law for particular
communities. Thus citizens of communities will encounter present
understandings of the natural law within the rules (and customs) of
their own societies.
But my scenario of ongoing acquisition of (our knowledge of) the
natural law is too simple as it now stands. Thomas builds into his
account of law a fourth type, one that also is derived from the eternal
law (divine providence), but that stands in curious relationship to the
natural law itself. This fourth type is the divine law, the law that is
revealed by God. This revelation comes in two distinct parts, the Old
Law and the New Law. It is necessary, Thomas tells us, because natural
law does not suffice to order us to God; although our inclίnationes
direct us to "connatural" goods, God alone can completely satisfy us,
and God is utterly beyond the reach of our powers. Thus the divine
law aids us so that we may attain God.51
Moreover, humankind suffers under the burden of sin, one man-
ifestation of which Thomas also characterizes as a quasi-law.52 The
lex fomitis is the law of concupiscence (literally, the law of tinder
49. Or, to name a community even more proximate, from an unjust family?
50. See Summa theobgiae 1-2.94.4 and 6.
51. Summa theobgiae 1-2.91.4.
52. Summa theologiae 1-2.91.6.
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or k ind l ing—the fire in the flesh tha t is no t completely subject to
reason) . It is a consequence of our primordial rejection of God , and
thus the unruliness of our passions const i tutes a further block to our
pursuit of the good, even as understood in terms of the natura l law.
T h u s our natura l powers are n o t only limited; they are infirm. Divine
law is necessary as a remedy for the effects of sin.
T h o m a s thus stresses n o t only the general social and historical
nature of our inquiry and pursuit of the good; he indicates tha t
there is one very specific communi ty and history to which we all
belong. W e are chi ldren of A d a m and Eve, and the history of us all
is located wi th in salvation history. T h u s the narrat ive of Scripture
is author i ta t ive in its explanatory power of our condi t ion (and tha t
condi t ion 's remedy) . 5 3
Going one step further: Is there in T h o m a s a place for the de-
ployment of stories wi th in the work of ethics? Recall wha t was said
earlier regarding the narrat ive structure of h u m a n experience itself.
It would t h e n seem tha t stories, speaking now of h u m a n constructs
apart from Scripture, are powerful shapers and informers of the self-
unders tanding of individuals and communi t ies , being reflective of the
fundamental ly narrat ive character of h u m a n experience. These might
serve as imaginative guides for us in the structuring and interpret ing
tha t must make up personal and communa l histories. T h a t Scripture
is clearly the most author i ta t ive story for T h o m a s need n o t entai l
the exclusion of o ther stories (ei ther creative artifacts or histories) as
influences or educators. Indeed, such stories would resemble Scripture
in their use of me taphor and example . 5 4 Still there is a quest ion:
Does Thomas ' s own unders tanding of moral theology accommodate
such a use of narrative? C a n it as well supply an account of how
such narratives would s tand in re la t ion to, or be integrated into,
53. See, for example, how Aquinas "reads" the infidelity of the Hebrews to the
Decalogue (reducible to the natural law): "[God] decided to give human beings a
Law which they could not fulfill of their own power so that, when they relied upon
themselves they would discover that they were sinners, and, humiliated, would have
recourse to the help of grace" (Summa theobgiae 1-2.98.2 ad 3, after the Blackfriars
translation). What we discover in reflection upon our natures is not just the natural
law but also the fact that we cannot, and will not, do what we know is our good.
54. See Thomas's remarks about the appropriateness of the use of metaphor in
Scripture, Summa theologiae 1.1.9.
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philosophical argument per se 1 These concerns take us well beyond the
scope of this present essay, but an answer to them would contribute
to a richer understanding of Thomistic ethics as well as Thomistic
method.55
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